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We don’t pay for that. This seems to be the message Angela Merkel and her government
want to convey to the Central and Eastern European neighbours who refuse to take their
share of responsibility for the redistribution of refugees in the EU. You owe us, and if you
don’t deliver, the Chancellor signals to Hungary and Poland in particular, we won’t pay.
Those who feed and integrate refugees will get more EU structural aid, and you’ll get less.
Fair enough. Do ut des; nisi des non do: This is how contracting parties talk to each other
since the days of Roman law, private autonomous actors who regard one another with
chilly indifference, with nothing more in common than the contract they have concluded with
each other. We have a deal, Polish and Hungarian friends, and what we expect from you is
exactly what you promised when you closed it, and nothing more. All the rest, your
judiciary, your media, your electoral shenanigans, are of no interest to us whatsoever and
we leave that entirely to your private autonomy. All we want is that you to deliver on your
promise.
Playing private-law hardball in this way seems to have a great advantage: It has a clear-cut,
no-nonsense logic to it, no lofty constitutional principles, no pious talk of fundamental
values and all that (although there’s no harm in dropping the “values” word passingly as
Merkel did in her speech), no democracy and rule of law wich no two people mean the
same thing by anyway. No delivery, no money. Very simple. Bam. Suspend payment.
But the bad news is that Hungary at least hasn’t promised anything. Hungary has never
agreed to that solidarity-based distribution of refugees invoked by the hardball-playing
Chancellor. Hungary, together with the Czech Republic, Romania and Slovakia (and unlike
Poland under its Civic Platform government at the time), had said ,No’ loud and clear at
that Council meeting on 22 September 2015, when the resettlement mechanism was
decided. Which, of course, doesn’t change the fact that Hungary, as Poland, is (or was)
legally bound to the decision, which has since expired. But they did not agree. Anything that
could be interpreted as a declaration of assent to an obligation to deliver? Nothing of that
sort.
The obligation of Hungary and Poland to take in refugees did not arise from their approval,
but from rules of collectively binding decision-making. These exist to impose a duty on
someone without his assent. By being outvoted. Call it constitutional law.
Hungary has been subject to such a duty and yet did not accept any obligation for itself,
explicitly and unabashedly. This is the actual scandal that puts Hungary in conflict with the
“fundamental European values”. Hungary and Poland are not just defaulting debtors or
disloyal business partners. The problem we have with them is not primarily a problem under
private law, but under public law. Has been the whole time. We cannot content ourselves
with the way Hungary and Poland practice their membership in Europe as a common
constitutional space.
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But this is not necessarily what the Chancellor talks of when she admonishes that
“solidarity” is “not a one-way street”. Whether one-, two- or multi-way street: this is not just a
question of who or what travels to and from Hungary in which direction, but whether traffic
rules are adhered to in the first place. As hardball-playing as the Chancellor may have
come across the day before the EU summit: That she did not talk about at all.
What if?
What Hungary and Poland play is not just hardball. It’s a game without rules. And they
don’t just play it with their own citizens and institutions. They’re playing it with us. And the
more success we let them have, the more likely it is that Germany will one day fall into the
hands of players who play only by rules of their own making. The debate on what this
scenario could mean for the Federal Constitutional Court has already arrived in Karlsruhe.
My report from the rather depressing annual press conference of the Constitutional Court is
here (German).
I have met with KLAUS FERDINAND GÄRDITZ this week to run through this scenario in an
extensive and, in my opinion, extraordinarily productive interview (German): How much
would a sufficiently determined parliamentary majority in Germany get away with, in terms
of neutralizing the Federal Constitutional Court, subjugating the judiciary, manipulating the
electoral law, without having to change one letter of the Grundgesetz? Result: a lot.
A huge reason to celebrate this week was the fact that the journalist Deniz Yücel has finally
been freed after more than a year of captivity in a Turkish jail. And yet, speaking of
subjugated judiciary, this process casts an all the more alarming light on the conditions of
rule of law in President Erdogan’s realm. DILEK KURBAN writes why this is and why the
impression that the Turkish Constitutional Court is still somehow a reliable factor in
nowadays Turkey couldn’t be more false.
It looks like a bizarre cold-war cloak-and-dagger spy novel what has taken place between
Germany and Vietnam in the last few months, with a Vietnamese businessman kidnapped
right out of Germany and resurfacing in Vietnam soon thereafter, where he was sentenced
to a life in prison. FIN-JASPER LANGMACK and BENJAMIN NUSSBERGER analyse what
international law has to say to both sides of this conflict (German).
Elsewhere
ANTJE VON UNGERN-STERNBERG and JULIA WAGNER scrutinize the ruling of the
state constitutional court of Rhineland-Palatinate, which found nothing to object to with the
way committee seats are allocated to the far-right AfD in the regional Parliament in Mainz
(German).
MATHIEU CARPENTIER jumps in the almost 60-year-old and recently rekindled fray in
France as to whether the president can push through a constitutional amendment by
means of a referendum in accordance with Article 11 of the French Constitution (French).
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ROSELINE LETTERON analyses a new decision of the French Constitutional Council,
according to which it violates the principle of equality to reserve compensation for victims of
terrorism and violence during the Algeria war 1954 to 1962 only for French citizens
(French).
PHILIP ALLOTT shows why the UK, no matter how vigorously it pushes the Article 50
button, cannot simply leave the European legal system behind it.
ANNICK PIJNENBURG defends the European Court of Human Rights against the
accusation that in the judgement of J. R. v. Greece it has closed its eyes to the conditions
in Greek refugee hotspots and the shortcomings of the EU-Turkey deal.
MANUEL MÜLLER calmly prophesies to Emmanuel Macron that he will lose his fight
against the Spitzenkandidaten process in the European elections in 2019 (German).
LORENZO GRADONI stages the recent Taricco disputes between the European Court of
Justice and the Italian Constitutional Court as a parody of the famous caskets scene in the
second act of Shakespeare’s Merchant of Venice (Italian).
Next week, the German Federal Constitutional Court will decide whether a federal Minister
of Education can rhetorically show the AfD the proverbial “red card” without unduly taking
sides in the competition of the political parties. We will further learn if the ECJ in
Luxembourg feels prepared to declare an EU fisheries agreement with Morocco invalid
because it covers Western Sahara, which is occupied by Morocco in breach of international
law. Finally, LAURENT PECH and KIM LANE SCHEPPELE will present ten questions and
answers on the EU’s capacity to fight authoritarianism. So plenty of things to do for us, and
plenty of things to read for you!
All the best, and a successful week,
Max Steinbeis
LICENSED UNDER CC BY NC ND
SUGGESTED CITATION  Steinbeis, Maximilian: Game without Rules, VerfBlog, 2018/2/24,
https://verfassungsblog.de/game-without-rules/.
3/3
